Robust growth driven by household consumption
After a radiant 2024 driven by services, Spanish growth will moderate in 2025, while still remaining vigorous and well ahead of the main European economies (Coface forecasts 1.1% for the euro zone). The economy will be driven by robust private domestic demand. Household consumption (representing about 55% of GDP) will be sustained by a gain in purchasing power thanks to moderate inflation, a dynamic labour market and, consequently, high growth in real gross disposable income. Wage negotiations should remain strong in 2025, in line with the fifth agreement on employment and collective bargaining (V AENC) of 2023, which calls for a 3% increase in 2025, thereby outperforming inflation forecasts. In addition, the buoyant labour market is being accompanied by an increase in the working population, driven by the arrival of immigrants. Between 2022 and the third quarter of 2024, the foreign population accounted for over 70% of the increase in the working population. Nevertheless, although resilient, private consumption has so far grown more modestly than real incomes. In the first half of 2024, household spending rose by an average of 2.4% compared with 2023, while gross disposable income increased by 10%. Hence, as is the case with many European countries, Spaniards are saving more than before the pandemic. In the fourth quarter of 2024, the household savings rate stood at 14.2% of disposable income, a historically high level well above pre-pandemic levels (the 2015-2019 average was 7.3%). This precautionary saving could therefore represent both a brake and an additional lever on the recovery in consumption in 2025.
That said, the net contribution of foreign trade is likely to lose momentum due to an acceleration in imports. While Spain will have once again enjoyed a record tourist year in 2024 driven by a foreign clientele (94 million arrivals, +10% compared with 2023), the normalisation of the sector's recovery should result in more limited growth. Services, however, will continue to benefit from the robustness of tourism, which will remain a fundamental pillar of the country's growth. Moreover, the Spanish economy will continue to be exposed to the fragile demand and recovery of its neighbours, since almost 65% of its goods exports (mainly cars, machinery, refined petroleum, pharmaceuticals, plastics and food) are destined for the rest of the European Union (71% when including the UK).
The recovery in private investment (representing around 20% of GDP) should be confirmed by the continued gradual improvement in financial conditions over the course of 2025. It could, however, be held back by corporate risk aversion in the face of persistent uncertainty in the international economic and geopolitical context. Investment will also be supported by the accelerated disbursement of European funds under the National Recovery Plan, with almost EUR 80 billion in grants and EUR 83 billion in loans for the period 2021-2026 (for a total equivalent to 13% of its GDP in 2019). Almost a third of this amount has already been disbursed. Disbursements should therefore accelerate significantly between 2025 and 2026, while Spain sent its fifth payment request in December 2024 for a total of almost EUR 25 billion. However, a more modest contribution from public spending is expected as part of the reintroduction of European budgetary rules.
Gradual consolidation of public accounts
Although there is a high risk that the 2025 Budget will not be passed – meaning that the 2023 Budget would be renewed for a second consecutive year – the consolidation of public accounts should be confirmed. However, these will still be largely in deficit after having deteriorated sharply during the health and energy crises. The reduction in the deficit will mainly result from the removal of VAT reductions on basic foodstuffs and electricity, which had been extended until the end of 2024. However, the government has extended public transport subsidies in force since 2022 until June 2025. Second, the positive trend in the deficit will also be supported by a tight labor market, which is fuelled in particular by strong migratory flows and increased labour force participation. At the same time, Royal decree-legislation provides for the extension of taxes on the windfall profits of banking institutions for the next three years and of energy companies until the end of 2025 (which, together, brought in almost EUR 3 billion euro in revenues in 2024), but this will have to be confirmed in Parliament in early 2025 as it is currently being debated by the government. Although Spain escaped the excessive deficit procedure last summer following the restoration of European budgetary rules, the sustainability of its very high public debt remains one of the country's medium-term challenges. Despite a downward trend in recent years, the country's net external public debt remains among the highest in the European Union (50.2% of GDP in Q3 2024).
Moreover, the current account surplus posted by the country since 2013 recovered rapidly after the health, and later, energy crisis and should stabilise by 2025. This clear improvement is due, in particular, to the substantial surplus on the services balance (over 6% of GDP in 2023), which has been revitalised by international tourism, which continued to post record levels in 2024, with an extension of the trend expected for 2025. This will help offset the structural deficit in the balance of goods, largely attributable to the country's energy dependence (although the energy bill has been falling since 2022), and in the balance of income (remittances from the Latin American and Moroccan diasporas to their countries of origin).
Fragmented coalition will continue to fuel risk of government instability
Following the snap parliamentary elections in July 2023, and in the absence of a viable alternative on the right, Socialist incumbent Prime Minister Pedro Sánchez (PSOE) managed to hold onto power despite coming second. Without an absolute majority (121 seats out of 350), the left-wing party was still in a better position to form a government than the rivalling right-wing Popular Party led by Alberto Núñez Feijóo. As a result, Sánchez was again forced to form a coalition with 179 votes, including those of his main left-wing ally Sumar (31), EH Bildu (6), ERC (7), Junts (7), PNV (5), BNG (1) and the Coalition Canarienne (1).
This multi-party coalition, which includes Catalan and Basque pro-independence parties, is a challenge to governance despite prior negotiations and previously granted controversial concessions, one notable example was the passing of an amnesty law pardoning Catalan separatists involved in the 2017 independence attempt, though it excluded Junts leader Carles Puigdemont who is still exiled in Belgium. The risk of political instability will therefore persist in 2025 as the head of government wrestles with the divergent opinions and interests of his partners. Hence, although Sánchez's coalition government was fairly stable during his previous term, its current dependence on regional pro-independence parties may result in political deadlock, as demonstrated by the delay in passing the 2025 Budget due to the lack of support from Catalan pro-independence Junts. The government's inability to pass the budget for a second consecutive year would again jeopardise its ability to govern due to the difficulty in obtaining parliamentary support. The complexity and fragility of Pedro Sánchez's coalition could also slow down the implementation of structural reforms required to receive European funds.